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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
case, where by operation of the statute, the survivor was entitled to
the money in the accounts. 14 The majority, however, held the form
of the account was not controlling and resorted to the Clary v.
Fitzgerald formula of weighing extrinsic evidence to determine
whether the decedent had, in effect, intended to create a joint tenancy.
The reasoning of the Court in support of this conclusion is none too
clear. It appears that the fact that the decedent was suffering from a
fatal illness, coupled with the fact that her actual intention was to
convey powers of attorney, permitted, in the mind of the majority, the
inference thai the decedent was incompetent; and, therefore, the in-
strument was not knowingly and consciously drawn. Under the cir-
cumstances, incompetency could have two possible implications:
(1) that there was a lack of rational capacity, of which there was no
evidence, or (2) that there was a lack of knowledge of the full legal
implications of the instrument signed. Here the law charges a person
with the legal consequences of the instrument signed, regardless of
the lack of such knowledge.1 5
Such a conclusion as was reached in the present case has de-
stroyed the conclusive effect of the statutory presumption and can
only lead to an uncertainty in the law which the Legislature had at-
tempted to erase with this conclusive provision. 6 It would seem that
the Court could have given effect to the intention of the decedent by
the imposition of a trust on the accounts, and thus avoided doing
violence to the act of the Legislature.
BANKS AND BANKING-NOTES DISCOUNTED BY NoN-BANKING
CORPORATION IN VIOLATION OF BANKING LAW SECTION 131 AND
GENERAL CORPORATION LAW SECTION 18 HELD Vom.-Plaintiff, an
accommodation indorser of five promissory notes.made to secure a
loan by defendant Discount Factors to the maker, sues to recover on
three notes alleging that they are invalid and that he made payment
under a mistake of law. The notes had no legal inception prior to
14 "... [T]he simple fact is that we are here concerned . . .with a docu-
ment creating a joint bank account. This, the legislature has said in the'plainest
of language, conclusively effects a right in the survivor, absent evidence of
incapacity, fraud or undue influence, to the balance in the account upon the
other's death." Matter of Creeknore, 1 N.Y.2d 284, 299-300, 135 N.E.2d 193,
201 (1956).
15 Knight v. Kitchin, 237 App. Div. 506, 511, 261 N.Y. Supp. 809, 815 (4th
Dep't 1933) (dictum).
16 In 1950, upon recommendation of the Law Revision Commission, a bill
excising the presumptive evidence clause from section 239(3) was submitted to
Judiciary Committee of the Legislature, but was never reported out of com-
mittee. See Ra'oaT, N.Y. LAw RE VsioN CoMMissioN 515, 567 (1950).
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their negotiation to Discount who deducted in advance the larger part
of its compensation in the form of a "bonus charge." A holder from
Discount sued the plaintiff upon the remaining two notes. The two
actions were consolidated. Held: the notes were void under Section
131 of the New York Banking Law, and no action could be main-
tained thereon. Since the jury found plaintiff-indorser paid with
knowledge of his rights, he could not recover. Miller v. Discount
Factors, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 275, 135 N.E.2d 33 (1956).
Section 131 of the Banking Law 1 and Section 18 of the General
Corporation Law 2 form part of a series of acts commencing in 1804 3
and commonly known as the "Restraining Acts." 4 They were enacted
to protect the monopoly of chartered banks 5 and to protect the public
against currency inflation by unauthorized banking.6 The policy of
monopolistic banking was abandoned in 1837,7 and in 1838 a general
statute for incorporation of banks was adopted.8  The two above
named statutes, however, continue the restraint upon the exercise of
banking functions by limiting the practice of discounting to banking
corporations.9
Whether these statutes prohibit corporations from making dis-
counts when they exercise no other banking functions or merely when
they make discounts in conjunction with other banking activities is a
1"Prohibitions against encroachments upon certain powers of banks and
trust companies.
"1 ..... No corporation, domestic or foreign, other than a national bank
or a federal reserve bank, unless expressly authorized by the laws of this
state, shall employ any part of its property, or be in any way interested
in any fund which shall be employed for the purpos6 of receiving de-
posits, making discounts . . . . All notes and other securities for the
payment of any money or the delivery of any property, made or given to
any such association, institution or company, or made or given to secure
the payment of any money loaned or discounted by any- corporation or its
officers, contrary to the provisions of this .section shall be void." N.Y.
BANKING LAW § 131.
2 "Prohibition of banking powers.
"No corporation, domestic or foreign, other, than a corporation formed
under or subject to the banking laws of this stke or of the United States,
and except as therein provided shall by any implication or construction be
deemed to possess the power of carrying on the business of discounting
bills, notes or other evidences of debt... ." N.Y. GEN. CORP. LAw § 18.3 Laws of N.Y. 1804, c. 117; extended by Laws of N.Y. 1818, c. 236.
4Note, 5 ST. JoHN's L. Rrv. 234, 237 (1931).
5 See N.Y. Firemen Ins. Co v. Ely, 2 Cow. 678, 711 (N.Y. 1824) ; Kupfer,
Prohibited Discounts Under tRe Banking and General Corporation Laws,
12 Rzcopu 30, 33 (1957).
6 See Curtis v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 69 (1857). See also the reference to
Governor Clinton's Message to the Legislature in 1 CONSOL. LAWS OF N.Y.
297 (Birdseye, Cumming & Gilbert, 1st ed. 1909).
7 Laws 6f.N.Y. 1837, c. 20. See Curtis'v. Leavitt, 15 N.Y. 9, 77 (1857).
8 Laws of N.Y. 1838, c. 260.
9 N.Y. BANIrNGd LAW § 131; N.Y. GEN. CoRP. LAW § 18.
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current problem. 1° Some early cases arose under the "Restraining
Acts" which lend support to the proposition that discounting is pro-
hibited to a non-banking corporation under all circumstances."' In
two later cases, notes discounted in violation of the "Restraining Acts"
were held void.' 2  Both cases, however, involved corporations doing
a full banking business when they had been granted only limited bank-
ing powers.13
Then came Meserole Securities Company V. Cosman 14 which laid
the foundation for the decision in the instant case. Meserole involved
the purchase by a non-banking corporation of certain existing notes at
less than face value from a holder thereof, not from the maker.15 The
corporation engaged in numerous similar transactions, but otherwise
exercised no banking powers.16 In upholding the validity of the notes
the Court recognized .that not every exercise of a power which banks
possess constitutes a banking business. 17  Powers conferred upon
banks may be ordinary business powers when exercised in a" commer-
cial transaction.'
The Legislature has, of course, not attempted to forbid business corpora-
tions from exercising any of these powers occasionally and incidentally to a
corhmercial business, but it has provided that no corporation shall by any
implication or construction be deemed to possess the power to carry on a
business which constitutes a form of banking business .... 19
The Court, however, chose to rest its decision upon a second ground,
holding that a corporation is not prohibited from purchasing notes
which had a valid inception at a discount "where such purchase is not
a mere device for carrying on the business of advancing or loaning
money at interest." 20 The distinction between notes discounted when
a loan is made, and the purchase of existing notes at a discount, has
been upheld in subsequent cases.
21
10 Kripke, Illegal "Discounts" By Non-Banking Corporations in New York,
56 COLUM. L. RZv. 1183, 1188 (1956).
"1 See People v. Bartow, 6 Cow. 290 (N.Y. 1826); National Bank of
Phoenix v. Warehousing Co., 6 Hun 71 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1875). But see People
v. Brewster, 4 Wend. 498 (N.Y. 1830).
12 Pratt v. Short, 79 N.Y. 437 (1880) ; New York State Loan and Trust Co.
.v. Helmer, 77 N.Y. 64 (1879).
13 Ibid.
14253 N.Y. 130, 170 N.E. 519 (1930).
15 Meserole Securities Co. v. Cosman, 253 N.Y. 130, 170 N.E. 519 (1930).
Is Ibid.
'1 Ibid.is Ibid.
19 Id. at 134, 170 N.E. at 520.
20 Id. at 147, 170 N.E. at 525. But see Atlantic State Bank v. Savery, 82
N.Y. 291 (1880).
21 See Siebros Finance Corp. v. 190 West Fourth St. Realty Corp., 256
N.Y. 586, 177 N.E. 151 (1931) (mem. opinion) (purchase); Pennsylvania
Factors Corp. v. S. Oldman, Inc., 272 App. Div. 1049, 74 N.Y.S.2d 670 (1st
Dep't 1947) (per curiam) (purchase); Yorkville Business Protective Corp. v.
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In the instant case the defendant, Discount Factors, a corpora-
tion organized under the Stock Corporation Law and authorized under
its charter to lend money, was in the business of lending money to
merchants and taking back their notes or buying their paper.22 The
face value of the notes under consideration totaled $15,000 with in-
terest at 6% per year. Discount Factors acquired them for $13,825
deducting a $675 bonus and $500 for the note broker. The effective
interest rate was thus 24% per year or more than the 6% discount
rate allowable to banks.2 3
The appellate division unanimously held that the transaction did
not violate the statutory prohibition against discounting.24 The court
interpreted the "Restraining Acts" as limited to a prohibition of en-
croachments on banking powers. Since the loan here was beyond that
possible by a bank and since there was no deduction of interest in
advance, no violation had occurred.25
The Court of Appeals, however, in a five-two decision, relied
upon the second ground of the Meserole decision. Since the notes
had not had a valid prior inception in a transaction between the bor-
rower and payee, the case was on the opposite side of the purchase-
loan distinction drawn in Meserole and the invalidity of the notes
could thus be established. 26 The fact that only "bonus charges" and
not interest had been deducted in advance did not alter the effect of
the transaction. The Court said "the word 'discount' has been inter-
preted to mean a charge for a loan in advance, whether called interest,
compensation or premium." 27  Section 131 of the Banking Law and
Section 18 of the General Corporation Law were interpreted by the
Court as prohibiting corporations from discounting notes even when
unaccompanied by any other banking operations. "The prohibitions
... are phrased in the disjunctive, and no corporation may be deemed
to possess the power to discount notes or do any other acts prohibited
by said statutes." 28
Friedman, 144 Misc. 325, 258 N.Y. Supp. 689 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1932) (per
curiam) (loan); Proper Spirit Trading Corp. v. Schilowitz, 140 Misc. 171,
250 N.Y. Supp. 118 (App. T. 1st Dep't 1931) (loan).
22 Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 275, 135 N.E.2d 33 (1956),
reversing 285 App. Div. 772, 141 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1st Dep't 1955).
23 N.Y. BANKING LAw § 108.
24 Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 285 App. Div. 772, 141 N.Y.S.2d 140
(1st Dep't 1955).
25 Ibid.
28 Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 275, 135 N.E.2d 33 (1956).
In Sabine v. Paine, 223 N.Y. 401, 119 N.E. 849 (1918), the defendant made a
note payable to her agent who had it discounted for her by the plaintiff at a
usurious rate. Although the plaintiff did not know that the note had had no
prior legal inception, and that he was loaning money upon it, the Court found
that a loan had been made when plaintiff discounted the note.
27 Miller v. Discount Factors, Inc., 1 N.Y.2d 275, 281, 135 N.E.2d 33, 37
(1956).
23 Id. at 282, 135 N.E. 33, 38.
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As the judicial interpretation of the restraining statutes has thus
evolved, if a borrower gives his note for $1,000 to a non-banking cor-
porate lender who supplies him with $940 cash, there has been an
illegal discount and the note is void. If the borrower instead makes
his note for $1;000 with interest at 6%6 and receives $1,000 in cash
from the lender, no discount being involved, the note is valid.
Although these two cases are clear cut, the line of distinction
is not nearly as apparent in other instances. Suppose the lender were
to ask for two notes, one for $1,000 representing the amount of the
loan and a separate note for the $60 charge. If the note for the prin-
cipal and the note for interest cannot be separated and the entire
transaction involves an illegal discount, what is the status of corporate
bonds with interest coupons attached if purchased by corporate
underwriters ? 29
The statutes under consideration are an example of the special
protection generally afforded to banks in the area of lending.30 The
instant case points out the need for a critical re-examination of the
"Restraining Acts" in the light of present day economic and com-
mercial activities. Lending by a non-banking corporation does not
create a deposit and have the indirect effects on the economy which
monetary regulation is designed to control.3 1 Therefore, a more
modified restriction of lending and discounting by non-banking cor-
porations may be sufficient.
M
rNSURANcE-Co-OPERATION CLAUSE-VERIFICATION OF THIRD-
PARTY CoMPLAINT.-Plaintiff-insurer brought this action to have a
policy declared forfeit. The mother of defendant-insured was the
driver of his car in an accident wherein defendant's father was killed.
Defendant's mother, as executrix, then sued defendant for wrongful
death for his imputed negligence. 1 Plaintiff undertook to defend in-
sured, but insured refused to verify a cross-complaint against his
mother. The Court held that the co-operation clause binding defen-
dant to "... assist . . . in the conduct of suits," did not obligate
29 See Kripke, Illegal "Discounts" By Non-Banking Corporations -in New
York, 56 CoLum. L. REv. 1183, 1192-93 (1956).
so Although a usurious instrument is void and no action may be maintained
thereon (N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 373) a bank may recover the principal of. a
note (N.Y. BANKING LAW § 108). See Schlesinger v. Gilhooly, 189 N.Y. 1,
81 N.E. 619 (1907).S 1Kripke, supra note 29, at 1196; .Kupfer, Prohibited Discounts Under the
Banking and General Corporation Laws, 12 RPEom) 30, 45-46 (1957).
1 N.Y. VEHICLE & TRAFFIc LAW § 59.
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